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Asymmetry of Technical Analysis and Market Price
Volatility
Abstract
Within the framework of heterogeneity and bounded rationality, this paper
models the financial market as an interaction of two types of boundedly rational
investors—fundamentalists and chartists. The model is characterised by a nonlin-
ear dynamical system. Applying stability and bifurcation theory, we examine the
dynamics of the market price and market behaviour. It is found that investors’
behaviour, in particular the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists and the interaction
of the two types of investors play a very important role in explaining the market
volatility. Numerical simulations of the corresponding stochastic model demon-
strate that the model is able to generate the stylised facts, including volatility
clustering, high kurtosis, and the long-range dependence of asset return observed
in financial markets.
Keywords: price fluctuation, bounded rationality, asymmetrical beliefs, stability,
bifurcation
JEL: C62, D53, E32, E44, G12
1
1 Introduction
Volatility is an inherent characteristic of financial markets. It provides investors
opportunities for obtaining high excess returns which are however associated with high
risk in general. With the development and diversity of financial markets, it becomes more
important and interesting to understand market volatility and its underlying market
mechanism.
The traditional financial theory developed since the 1950s is based on the assumptions
of the rational expectation and the representative agent. Based on the assumptions, asset
prices are the outcome of the market interaction of utility maximising agents who use
rational expectations when forming their expectations about future market outcomes.
Preferences of agents are assumed to satisfy conditions that enable the mass of investors
to be considered as a single representative agent. Since agents are rationally impounding
all relevant information into their trading decisions, the movement of prices is assumed
to be perfectly random and hence exhibit the so-called random walk behaviour. Namely,
market prices do not change if there is no new information, see Fama (1965). These are
the classical rational expectation and efficient market hypothesis. This view is important
in empirical finance, see Sargent (1993). It is also the basis of the stochastic price
mechanisms assumed in many of the key theoretical models in finance, such as the optimal
portfolio theory that has developed out of the work of Markowitz (1952) and Merton
(1971), the static and dynamic capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner
(1965), Mossin (1966) and Merton (1973), and models for the pricing of contingent claims
beginning with the work of Black and Scholes (1973). The empirical work represented
by Fama (1976) provided favourable evidence in earlier empirical studies to support the
market efficiency and random walk hypothesis and financial experts and economists have
used the theory to explain observed market prices.
There appears a range of abnormal phenomena in financial markets, however, which
cannot be explained within the framework of the traditional financial theory since the
1980s. They include equity premium puzzle (the anomalously higher historical real re-
turns of stocks over government bonds), excess volatility (excess volatility of stock price
cannot be explained by rational fundamental value adjustment based on random news),
volatility clustering (large changes tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign,
and small changes tend to be followed by small changes), long memory (returns per se
are unpredictable but their absolute and squared values have significant autocorrelation
with a hyperbolic decay structure), popularity of technical analysis (such as simple mov-
ing average, momentum strategy and percentage retracement) and herd behaviour (the
tendency for individuals to mimic the rational or irrational actions of a larger group).
In addition, the return distribution displays characteristics which are different from nor-
mal distribution underlying the traditional finance theory, such as skewness, fat tail and
higher kurtosis. Certainly the 1987 crash has been well researched but so far there is no
satisfactory explanation of what was the “news event” that triggered such a large market
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movement. This led to some questioning of the basic tenets of the rational expectation
and efficient market hypothesis, though they have played very important roles in the
earlier development of finance theory. Due to incomplete and asymmetrical information
in financial markets, investors are very often not able to make perfectly rational deci-
sions. In addition, market price is the outcome of interaction of different investors in the
market and these heterogeneity and interaction are not characterised in the traditional
representative agent financial theory.
In 1957, Simon proposed a hypothesis of bounded rationality. Since then, this hy-
pothesis has been developed further, in particular, in the 1990s. “Bounded rationality”
means that investors in the real world can at best be boundedly rational when making
decision under uncertainty, have limited computational power, information and wealth,
and are heterogeneous with respect to risk-preferences and the way in which they form
expectations. Heterogeneity was proposed in Zeeman (1974), Beja and Goldman (1980)
and De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) by considering markets that are
characterised by investors with heterogeneous beliefs and different psychology behaviour.
Within the framework of bounded rationality and heterogeneous markets, the interaction
of investors and the change of market prices can be described by nonlinear dynamical
systems. Based on this new framework, Day and Huang (1990) and Chiarella (1992) find
that, even without new information, interaction among investors with heterogeneous be-
liefs in markets can generate rich market price behaviour and even market bubbles and
crashes. It shows that it is due to the internal mechanism, rather than external distur-
bances, that can produce complex market fluctuation, which offers a new explanation
to the market crash in 1987. The stability and bifurcation theory of nonlinear dynam-
ical systems provides a mathematical tool to study market complexity within the new
framework, leading to a broad application to the studies in finance and economics over
the past twenty years, see the survey paper of Chang (2006). In particular, within the
framework of bounded rationality, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) propose a concept of
adaptively rational equilibrium, called BH model hereafter. A key aspect of the model
is the expectation feedback. Namely, agents adapt their beliefs over time by choosing
different expectations and investment strategies based upon their past performance; at
the same time, their beliefs influence the market price and hence the performance of
different trading strategies. Applying the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems, they
find that the rational selection of investors can be characterised by a switching intensity
of investors among different strategies based on their performance. When the switching
intensity increases, for example turnover ratio is high, market prices fluctuate with high
volatility and even become chaotic. This phenomenon underlines a fact that individual’s
rational decision can lead to randomness and complexity of the market. The findings
in Brock and Hommes provide a theoretical explanation to the change of the trading
rule used in Chinese stock markets from T + 0 to T + 1 to reduce the switching inten-
sity of investors and stabilise the market. Later, following the framework of BH model,
Chiarella and He (2002, 2003) study the effect of risk averse coefficients and investment
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strategies of investors in different market scenarios on market prices. Hommes, Huang
and Wang (2005) demonstrate the robustness of BH model. Chiarella, He and Hommes
(2006) extend BH model to study the dynamic behaviour of moving average rules and
explain various market price phenomena including temporary bubbles, sudden market
crashes, and price switching between different levels. Gaunersdorfer, Hommes and Wa-
gener (2007) try to provide an explanation in the generating mechanism on the volatility
clustering based on BH model. Using empirical data, Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan
(2007) and Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) test the explanation power of BH model
to real markets by applying some statistic methods. Recently, He and Li (2007b, 2008)
use a simpler market fraction model to describe the relationship between the phenomena
and statistic characteristics observed in real markets and the dynamic behaviour of the
underlying deterministic model, showing that the model is able to generate many stylised
facts (especially long memory) which is difficult to explain in the traditional finance the-
ory. They provide an explanation successfully on the generating mechanism from the
viewpoint of dynamics. We refer the reader to the survey paper of Hommes (2006) for the
development in this literature. In another survey paper, Chiarella, Dieci and He (2009)
provide a comprehensive summary about how to use the method of nonlinear dynamical
systems to study the market price changes within the framework of heterogeneous belief
and bounded rationality. In addition, there is a great contribution in artificial financial
markets to explore complex phenomena in real markets, for example, Lettau (1997),
LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer (1999) and Chen and Yeh (2001). We refer the reader to
the surveys of LeBaron (2006) and Chen (2007) for the development in this literature.
All the literature has demonstrates that the models are able to describe some stylised
phenomena observed in financial markets, such as volatility persistence and fat tail, and
provide insight into the important role of investors’ heterogeneity and bounded rational-
ity in explaining market volatility. This demonstrates that nonlinear dynamical system
as a mathematical tool provides a great potential to the study of this new framework.
More recently, the method has been extended to the study in exchange rate markets and
macroeconomics, see, for example Chiarella, He and Zheng (2009). In this paper, we
seek to use the framework of heterogeneous beliefs and bounded rationality to study the
impact of asymmetric belief in technical analysis on market volatility.
In the current literature of heterogeneous agent models, it is usually assumed that
heterogeneous beliefs of agents are either linear or nonlinear but symmetric, meaning
that investors have symmetric beliefs to changes of market prices in different market
situations. However, in real markets, investors can have different views on the market
condition and react differently to ups and downs of market prices. In other words, there
exists an asymmetric effect in financial markets and investors can have asymmetric views
on price signals in different market situations. For example, Veronesi (1999) shows that
in equilibrium, investors’ willingness to hedge against changes in their own “uncertainty”
on the true state makes stock price overreact to bad news in good times and underreact to
good news in bad times. Lu and Xu (2004) find that the asymmetric market reaction in
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the Chinese stock markets is different from other countries. Using EGARCH model, they
test asymmetric characteristics of the Chinese stock markets in bullish/bearish states
and explain the “Matthew Effect” from aspects of anticipation, structure, psychology
and trading mechanism. Based on the data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, He and
Li (2007a) analyse the asymmetric characteristics of return and volatility in different
market trends and find that there is obvious difference of mean-reverting between bull
and bear markets and rational expectation hypothesis does not hold. Hirshleifer (2001)
gives a nice survey on investor psychology and asset pricing.
The questions are then how to model the asymmetric views of investors and what
is the impact of the asymmetric reaction on market price volatility. An understanding
of these questions hopes to help us to explain complex phenomena in financial mar-
kets. In this paper, within the framework of BH model and Chiarella, He and Hommes
(2006), we introduce an asymmetric belief into one of commonly used technical strate-
gies, namely percentage retracement, and examine the impact of the asymmetric beliefs
of the chartists on the market complexity, in particular, the market price volatility by
using the tools of nonlinear dynamical systems and statistics. By analysing the corre-
sponding deterministic model, we find that the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists to
market price signals play an important role in the deviation of market price from its
fundamental value. In addition, the adaptive behaviour of investors to update their
strategies based on their performance results in herding behaviour and enforces market
volatility. This implies that the bounded rational behaviour of investors is an important
source of market volatility. Therefore, market volatility is the intrinsic characteristics of
the development of financial markets.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up an asset pricing model of the fun-
damentalists and chartists who have asymmetric beliefs about market. Mathematically,
the model is described by a high-dimensional stochastic nonlinear dynamical system.
To help our understanding, we focus more on the economic intuition of the analysis of
the model. Following the standard approach in nonlinear dynamical systems, Section 3
applies the stability and bifurcation theory to analyse the corresponding deterministic
model without random perturbations and to examine the stability and complexity of
the model. This analysis provides a theoretic foundation for the analysis of the orig-
inal stochastic model. In Section 4, we introduce market noise and assume that the
fundamental price follows a stochastic process. By numerical simulations, we explore
the impact of the asymmetric beliefs and the random perturbations on market price.
Further economic discussion and a conclusion are included in Section 5. To focus on the
economic intuition, rather than the technical details, of the model, we leave the mathe-
matical proofs of the theoretic results in the appendix. We hope this paper can provide
a new framework and approach for the Chinese researchers to study qualitatively and
quantitatively financial market behaviour and help us to improve our understanding of




Consider a market with one risky asset (for instance stock, index or managed fund)
and one risk free asset. Let Pt denote the price (ex dividend) per share of the risky
asset at time t, and let yt be the stochastic dividend process of the risky asset. The
risk free asset is perfectly elastically supplied at return r. In our paper, we assume the
risky asset price is determined by a market maker who adjusts the market price based on
the imbalance between demand and supply. That is, when demand exceeds supply, the
price goes up and otherwise the price goes down. Different from the rational expectation
and representative agent hypothesis in the traditional theory, we assume that investors
have heterogeneous beliefs and they are bounded rational. The heterogeneous beliefs are
described by different expectations about future price, while the bounded rationality is
captured by different trading strategies based on different beliefs and adaptive switching
among different strategies based on their performance. Heterogeneous expectations have
been found in empirical studies, especially in exchange rate markets, and have been used
widely in modelling financial market behaviour. In line with Chiarella, He and Hommes
(2006), we group different types of investors by their beliefs and the risky asset price can







where Q represents the set of types of investors, Dqt (q ∈ Q) is the excess demand of type
q trader at time t, nq,t is the market fraction of type q traders at time t. The number
of investors can be arbitrary but the fractions of all types of investors must satisfy∑
q∈Q nq,t = 1. Here it is necessary to point out that it is usually assumed in traditional
models that the market maker adjusts the risky asset price in absolute amount based
on the aggregate excess demand, that is Pt+1 − Pt = P(Dt). Under this mechanism, the
market price can be negative; also, when there is a same excess demand for the risky
asset with different fundamental prices, the stock price evolution is the same, which is
not realistic. In our model, we adopt the relative price, instead of the absolute price,
adjustment mechanism of the market maker. Namely,
Pt+1 − Pt
Pt








where S(x) is a monotonically increasing function, which models the function of price
adjustment by the market maker in market maker scenario. A consideration of wealth
constraint and the stylising role of the market maker implies that the function S(x)
is usually assumed to be an S-shaped function, see Figure 1. For simplicity, we take
S(x) = k tanh(hx), where 0 < k < 1, h > 0. Therefore, when Dt > 0, there exists
an excess demand in the market which pushes the price up, namely Pt+1 > Pt. When
Dt < 0, there exists an excess supply in the market, pushing the price down Pt+1 < Pt.
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In addition, under the assumption of S(x) = k tanh(hx),∣∣∣∣∣Pt+1 − PtPt
∣∣∣∣∣ < k.
Hence, k represents the maximum up and low limits of the risky asset price, like the 10%
up and low price limits used in the Chinese stock markets. The parameter µ = S ′(0) = kh
measures the adjustment speed near zero excess demand, which captures the future price
change when the excess demand is close to zero. For an economic explanation of the S-
shaped function, we refer the reader to Chiarella (1992) and Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini
(2002).
Insert Figure 1 here
In financial markets, investment strategies capturing different price expectations are
used widely, among which, two types of investors are especially common, fundamentalists
who use fundamental analysis and chartists who use various price indices of the future
price trend. For simplicity, we assume throughout this paper that there are only two
types of traders, fundamentalists and chartists, that isQ = {fundamentalists, chartists}
(in brief Q = {f, c}). Their trading strategies and excess demand functions are specified
in the following discussion.
Fundamentalists–The fundamentalists are assumed to know the fundamental infor-
mation of the risky asset. They use the fundamental analysis and believe that the market
price can deviate from its fundamental value, but in long run, it will converge to the
neighborhood of the fundamental value. Therefore, the fundamentalists focus on the
long-run change of the risky asset price. We assume that the fundamentalists know the
fundamental price of the risky asset and their excess demand depends on the deviation
of the market price from the fundamental value. At time t, without constraint in wealth,
their excess demand Dft is assumed to be proportional to the difference between the
fundamental price Ft and the market price Pt, namely
Dft = α(Ft − Pt),
where α > 0 is the reaction coefficient of the fundamentalists, which represents the mean-
reverting beliefs of the fundamentalists. When Ft > Pt, the fundamentalists believe that
the risky asset is undervalued and so they take a long position. Contrarily, the price is
regarded as overvaluation and so they take a short position. Moreover, the more price
deviation, the more excess demand. In general, from the viewpoint of the market price
containing the information of the fundamental, the fundamentalists play an active role
in stabilising markets. However, when their adjustment speed (α) is too high, they can
make the market unstable. The phenomena of the stability and instability induced by
the fundamentalists’ over-adjustment will be discussed in detail.
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Chartists–The chartists believe that the charting signals from past prices contain
some information about the future change of the price of the risky asset. They prefer
cheaper thumb strategies, such as simple moving average, percentage retracement, mo-
mentum, Fibonacci studies, and other popular technical methods in financial markets,
see Murphy (2004). In our paper, we mainly seek to analyse the effect of percentage
retracement (PR). A retracement is a countertrend move. The retracement is based on
the thought that prices will reverse or “retrace” a portion of the previous movement
before resuming their underlying trend in the original direction. For example, 33%, 50%
and 66% retracement rates are well known as illustrated in Figure 2. In particular, when
the chartists believe 50% retracement, when the short down-adjustment of the market
price during the rising price trend does not cross the line of 50% PR, the chartists believe
that the price down-trend has not been formed, the market price is just in a temporary
adjustment and it will go up after the adjustment and they hence take a long position
on the risky asset; otherwise they believe that the price down-trend is doomed and the
rising price phase is over, so they take a short position on the risky asset, see Figure
2(a). Similarly, the price up-adjustment case is shown in Figure 2(b). It shows that the
chartists focus on the short-term change of the risky asset price in making their invest-
ment decision. This short-term investment behaviour is one of the sources of market
instability, especially when there is an instantaneous big shock in the market.
Insert Figure 2 here
The percentage retracement strategy of the chartists can therefore be expressed by
the weighted historical prices, that is,
P̂t = (1− ω)Pt−1 + ωPt−2,
which captures the expected price of the chartists, where ω ∈ [0, 1] represents the coef-
ficient of the retracement strategy. In particular, if ω = 50%, P̂t is the simple moving
average of length 2. ω = 33% and 66% respectively represent the 33% and 66% retrace-
ment strategies. A trading signal to trade for the chartists is defined as the difference1
δt between the current price Pt and the expectation price P̂t, that is δt = Pt− P̂t. When
δt > 0, the chartists believe that the price is in a rising trend and they hence take a
long position; otherwise, they take a short position. Mathematically, this strategy of the
chartists can be written as
Dct = g(δt).
Usually g is a monotonically increasing function of trading signals. Considering a wealth
constraint for the chartists, g is usually assumed to be an S-shaped function, for example
g(x) = u tanh(vx)(u > 0, v > 0). Note that under the assumption, g(·) is a symmetric
and monotonically increasing function and lim
x→±∞
|g(x)| = u < ∞. It means that the
chartists’ views to positive and negative trading signals are symmetric and the chartists
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are cautious but not very cautious when the price difference δt is large (either positive
or negative). In contrast, empirical analysis in Veronesi (1999) and Lu and Xu (2004)
show that investors have asymmetric views to market information in financial markets.
In addition, when the market price is far away from the level indicated by the price
trend, the chartists become cautious. In this paper, we consider the chartists who have
different views on the market, for instance, they prefer buying/selling to selling/buying in
bullish/bearish markets facing the same price deviation δt; they buy/sell more/smaller
in bullish markets compared with bearish markets. They are cautious for large price
rise or fall. These behaviour assumptions imply that g satisfies the following general
properties, see Figure 3: there exist x∗1 < 0, x
∗
2 > 0 such that
g(0) = 0, xg(x) > 0 for x 6= 0, (2a)
g′(x) > 0 for x∗1 < x < x
∗
2; g





g(x) = gl < +∞, lim
x→x∗2
g(x) = gu > −∞. (2c)
Insert Figure 3 here
In this paper, we take g(x) = ax
1+bx+c2x2
where a > 0, c > 0, b ∈ (−2c, 2c). It can
be verified that g satisfies the conditions in (2). In particular, the choice of the function
has the following implications.
(i) x∗1 = −1c , x∗2 = 1c , g(−1c ) = − a2c−b , g(1c ) = a2c+b . Condition (2a) means that when
the price has no trend (that is δt = 0), the chartists do nothing. However when
there is positive (negative) trend in the risky asset price, they will talk a long
(short) position which is limited because of the wealth constraint. The maximum
(minimum) excess demand achieves at |δt| = 1/c and the amount depends on the
parameters a, b, c.
(ii) The parameter c measures the confident level of the chartists to extrapolate the
price trend. When the price deviation |δt| is below the confident level 1c , the
chartists are confident. The larger the deviation of the price is, the more the
excess demand of the chartists is. However, if the price deviation |δt| is beyond the
confident level 1
c
, the chartists are cautious in making an investment decision: the
larger the deviation of the price is, the smaller the excess demand of the chartists
is. Thus, ±1
c
captures the taking-profit and stop-losing levels of the chartists.
(iii) The parameter a = g′(0) > 0 measures the chartists’ extrapolation when x is small.
For small (large) values of a, the chartists’ demand is very insensitive (sensitive) to
small changes in x, which may characterise the unwillingness (willingness) of the
chartists to get into the market when changes in x are small.
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(iv) The parameter b measures the asymmetry of the chartists’ response to changes of
x. For b = 0, the chartists’ long and short positions are symmetric with respect to
the change of x. However, for b 6= 0, the position of the chartists for positive and
negative information is not symmetric. This means that the chartists have different
views towards the market. The phenomenon is called the asymmetric effect. In
particular, when b < 0, we have a
2c+b
> a
2c−b and the chartists have a bullish view
on the market. Otherwise, when b > 0, a
2c+b
< a
2c−b and the chartists have a bearish
view on the market. We call b the bull-bear coefficient, in brief B-coefficient2.
(v) The function satisfies lim
x→±∞
g(x) = 0, meaning that when the price difference x
between the current price and the expectation price trend of the chartists is getting
far away, the chartists become cautious and reduce their demand.
We have quantitatively introduced the heterogeneous beliefs of the investors and
their rational investment strategies guided by their beliefs. Now we turn to bounded
rationality of the investors based on the adaptive behaviour of the investors.
Fitness Measure and Fraction Evolution–At time t, the fitness measure piq,t(q = f, c)
of type q traders can be defined as their realised net profit:
piq,t = (Pt + yt −RPt−1)Dqt−1 − Cq,
where R = 1 + r, Cq ≥ 0 is the transaction cost of type q trader. Since fundamental
information is expensive, the cost for the fundamentalists is more than that for the
chartists, implying that C = Cf−Cc ≥ 0. More generally, one can introduce accumulated
performance measure by considering a weighted average of the net realised profit and
past performance as follows:
Uq,t = piq,t + ηUq,t−1, (3)
where the parameter η ∈ [0, 1) represents the memory of the accumulated fitness func-
tion.
Similarly to Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and Chiarella, He and Hommes (2006),








βUq,t and the parameter β(≥ 0) is the switching intensity measuring
how fast the fractions of different type agents in the market switch each other, based
on the performance measure. In particular, for β =∞, all the investors will choose the
optimal strategy in each period. For a more extensive discussion on the discrete choice
model, we refer to Manski and McFadden (1981) .
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, nc,t = 1− nf,t,
Uq,t = (Pt + yt −RPt−1)Dqt−1 − Cq + ηUq,t−1, q ∈ {f, c},
Dft = α(Ft − Pt), Dct = g
(











α(Ft − Pt) + 1
eβUt + 1
g(Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2)
)]
,
Ut+1 = (Pt+1 + yt+1 −RPt)
[
α(Ft − Pt)− g
(
Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2
)]− C + ηUt. (5)
When the fundamental price Ft and the dividend yt are random, (5) is a stochastic
dynamical system. Given the challenges in the theory of stochastic dynamical systems,
we firstly assume Ft and yt are deterministic and focus on the effect of investment
behaviour of the fundamentalists and chartists on the market price by using theory
of deterministic dynamic systems. We then analyse the original system (5) through
stochastic simulations.
3 Dynamical Behaviour of Deterministic Model
In this section, we assume that the fundamental price is deterministic, that is Ft ≡












Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2
))]
,
Ut+1 = (Pt+1 + y¯ −RPt)
[
α(F ∗ − Pt)− g
(
Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2
)]− C + ηUt. (6)
The system is equivalent to a 4-dimensional nonlinear difference system. The dynamic
study of the system includes the existence and uniqueness, stability of equilibria, and
the complex phenomena induced from instability. This is the standard method in the
stability and bifurcation theory of nonlinear dynamical systems. The theory has been
well developed and used widely in many fields. In the past twenty years, the theory has
been applied into many aspects of economic study by providing a new approach to study
complex phenomena of financial markets. In this section, we apply the theory to study
the system (6) in order to understand the impact of heterogeneous beliefs and bounded
rationality on the market price.
The stability of the market plays a very important role in the development of financial
markets. The stability of market equilibria of (6) can be described by the following
proposition.
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n∗c = 1 − n∗f and α¯ := F ∗µn∗fα, a¯ := F ∗µn∗ca. Then for the deterministic dynamical
system (6),
(1) there exist two steady states (P ∗1 , U
∗
1 ) = (0,
αF ∗y¯−C




2 ) = (F
∗, U∗),
(2) (P ∗1 , U
∗
1 ) is unstable for all parameters (a¯, α¯, ω),
(3) (P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ) is locally asymptotically stable(LAS) for (a¯, α¯, ω) ∈ D, where
D =
{







(1 + ω)a¯− 1)
a¯ω
}
< α¯ < 2 + 2a¯(1− ω);
ω = 0, 0 < a¯ < 1, 0 < α¯ < 2 + 2a¯
}
.
Insert Figure 4 here
Proposition 1 indicates that the system (6) has two steady states. The price of the
first steady state (P ∗1 , U
∗
1 ) is zero. This steady state is always unstable. This implies
that an asset with zero price has no value and such asset does not exist in financial
markets. In addition, it also implies that an under-valued asset will recover its value.
This phenomenon is consistent with what we observe in financial markets. The price
of the second steady state (P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ) is the fundamental value F
∗ of the risky asset and
we call (P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ) the fundamental steady state. The stability of the fundamental steady
state is determined by the parameters ω, a¯ = F ∗µn∗ca and α¯ = F
∗µn∗fα, see Figure 4,
where (a¯, α¯) are the adjusted reaction intensities (or called extrapolation rates) of the
fundamentalists and chartists scaled by the fundamental price F ∗, the speed of the price
adjustment µ, and the market fractions, nf and nc. Based on the stable region of the
fundamental steady state in Figure 4(b), we can see that, when the parameters (a¯, α¯) are
close to the diagonal, the fundamental steady state is stable; when ω is smaller, (a¯, α¯)
need to be closer to the diagonal in order to maintain the stability of the fundamental
steady state. This indicates that the stability of the fundamental steady state can be
maintained when the behaviour between the fundamentalists and chartists are balanced.
Thus, when the beliefs of the two types of investors are very different, especially when the
chartists put more weight to the last price when forming their expectation, the stability
of the fundamental price is hardly maintained and the market price will be driven away
from its fundamental value. In addition, if the up and low limit (k) of the risky asset
price is large, the adjustment parameter (µ) of the price increases and moreover, a¯ and α¯
become larger so that (a¯, α¯) leave the stability region of the fundamental steady state and
(P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ) becomes unstable. Hence, an increase in price up and low limit increases the
possibility of the market price deviation from its fundamental value. Thus, by controlling
this limit, the market can be stabilised. This observation supports the policy of limiting
daily price change by up to 10% implemented in the Chinese stock markets since 1996.
12
In addition, as an adjusting coefficient, the fundamental price also affects the stability
of the fundamental steady state. That implies that asset with different fundamental
prices can have very different dynamical behaviour, which, to some extent, explains the
diversity of market prices.
The parameter β measures the switching intensity between investment strategies by
investors. The bigger β is, the more the investors prefer to the strategy with better
performance. When β = 0, the fundamentalists and chartists hold 50% of the market
fraction respectively, namely nf = nc ≡ 12 . This means that, when there is no switching
among different strategies, there is no evolution of the fractions between the fundamen-
talists and chartists. When β > 0, the market fractions of the fundamentalists and














Thus, whenever the fundamental price is stable, the chartists always hold a positive
market fraction and will not be driven out of the market. When it costs more for
the fundamentalists than for the chartists, that is C > 0, the chartists will hold more
fraction than the fundamentalists, that is n∗c > 0.5 > n
∗
f > 0, when the market is stable.
In particular, if the relative cost between the fundamentalists and chartists becomes
higher so that C → ∞, then the market is totally controlled by the chartists, that is
n∗c → 1. The fundamentalists and chartists have the same proportions n∗c = n∗f = 0.5
only when they pay the same cost C = 0. At the steady state, both forecasting rules
yield exactly the same performance and hence the traders prefer a cheaper strategy. We
call this phenomenon the cost effect. Note that the cost effect is comparative in terms
of C = Cf − Cc. If the costs of all investors increase but the comparative cost stays the
same, then the dynamics of (6) does not change.
In summary, the behaviour of the fundamentalists and chartists plays an important
role in market evolution. When the activities of the fundamentalists and chartists are
balanced each other so that (α¯, a¯, ω) ∈ D, the fundamental steady state is stable. Other-
wise, the market price of the risky asset deviates from its fundamental value. Proposition
1 plots a quantitative picture for this phenomenon.
The stability of financial markets might be desirable, especially in the current global
financial crisis; however, the instability of the market is the most of the market circum-
stances. Thus, it is more important to study the market instability and complex phe-
nomena resulted in. In order to provide some insight into the impact of the investors’
behaviour on the risky asset price, in particular when the market becomes unstable, we
focus on the role of the extrapolation rates of the fundamentalists and chartists in the fol-
lowing discussion, in particular, the effect of the extrapolation rate (a) and B-coefficient
(b) of the chartists while the effect of the fundamentalists is referred to Zheng (2007).
By assuming that the chartists hold a percentage retracement strategy with a con-
stant weight ω ∈ (0, 1), we now study the effect of the adjusted extrapolation rate (a¯)
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and the asymmetric belief coefficient (b) of the chartists on the market. The stability
of the fundamental steady state depends on the location of the eigenvalues of the char-
acteristic polynomial of the steady state. When all the eigenvalues are located inside
the unit circle, the fundamental steady state is locally asymptotically stable; otherwise,
it becomes unstable. The change from the stability to instability of the fundamental
steady state is determined by the movement of the eigenvalues from the inside to outside
of the unit circle. When the adjusted extrapolation rate of the fundamentalists α¯ satis-
fies 0 < α¯ < 2
ω
and the adjusted extrapolation rate of the chartists increases to a¯∗, there
exists a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues on the unit circle for the corresponding
characteristic equation, where
a¯∗ =
α¯ω − 1 +√(α¯ω − 1)2 + 4(ω + ω2)
2(ω + ω2)
.
Therefore, at a¯ = a¯∗, the stability of the fundamental steady state is destroyed, leading to
periodic fluctuations or more complex behaviour in (6). This phenomenon is described by
different types of bifurcations in the framework of nonlinear dynamical systems. In our
model, the instability of the fundamental steady state can be induced by either Neimark-
Sacker or Chenciner bifurcations. A Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs when changing
parameter of the system leads to a change in the stability of the fixed point, resulting in a
(quasi-)periodic cycle around the fixed point. In this case the market price will fluctuate
(quasi-)periodically around its fundamental value. A Chenciner bifurcation occurs in
the following situation. Near the bifurcation values of the parameters, a locally stable
fixed point is companied by a locally stable (quasi-)periodic cycle around it, and these
two attractors are separated by an unstable (quasi-)periodic cycle. As the parameters
change, the unstable (quasi-)periodic cycle merges together with the fixed point so that
the fixed point becomes unstable and there remains a locally stable (quasi-)periodic cycle.
The appearance of a Neimark-Sacker or Chenciner bifurcation depends on the first and
second Lyapunov coefficients, see Kuznetsov (2004), which are denoted by `1(a¯, b) and
`2(a¯, b), respectively. More precisely, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 (Generalised Neimark-Sacker Bifurcation) For fixed ω ∈ (0, 1), we choose
α¯ ∈ (0, 2
ω
) and assume (1 + ω)a¯∗ + 1− α¯ 6= 2 cos(2pi
q
), where q = 1, . . . , 6.
(1) If for any b, `1(a¯
∗, b) 6= 0, then the fundamental steady state undergoes a Neimark-
Sacker bifurcation at a¯ = a¯∗.







∗, b∗) 6= 0, then the fundamental steady state undergoes a Chenciner bifurcation
at (a¯, b) = (a¯∗, b∗).
Proposition 2 depicts the characteristics of the market price when the fundamental
steady state loses its stability through different bifurcations. In order to understand
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the dynamical characteristics when the fundamental steady state loses its stability, it
is necessary to calculate the first and second Lyaponov coefficients of (6) at the funda-
mental steady state. By the theorem of central manifold and the normal form theory
of generalised Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, see Kuznetsov (2004), the first and second
Lyapunov coefficients can be calculated by using the Maple program. For convenience
in calculation, we select ω = 0.5, F ∗ = 100, k = 0.1, h = 0.1, α = 1.2, β = 1, η = 0.2,
R = 1.001, C = 0.1 and choose a as the bifurcation parameter, then the Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation point occurs at a∗ ≈ 1.4514 which is independent of the choice of b and c.
For fixed c = 1.2, the type of bifurcations is determined by the first Lyapunov coefficient
satisfying a quadratic function of b ∈ (−2c, 2c)
`1 = 0.1898b
2 − 0.0019b− 0.4683. (7)
When b = b∗1 ≈ −1.5660 or b = b∗2 ≈ 1.5759, `1 = 0, ∂`1∂b
∣∣
b=b∗1,2
6= 0 and `2(b∗1) ≈ −0.2736,
`2(b
∗
2) ≈ −0.2721. Therefore, when a = a∗ and b = b∗1,2, the fundamental steady state
undergoes a Chenciner bifurcation. That is,
(i) when b∗1 < b < b
∗
2, if a < a
∗, the fundamental steady state is stable; at a = a∗,
the fundamental steady state undergoes a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
with `1 < 0; however if a > a
∗, the fundamental steady state is unstable and a
stable invariant circle appears around the fundamental steady state;
(ii) when b < b∗1 or b > b
∗
2, if a < a
∗, the fundamental steady state is stable; if a increases
to a∗, there exist a stable fundamental steady state and a stable invariant circle
which are separated by a unstable invariant circle. At a = a∗, the fundamental
steady state undergoes a subcritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation with `1 > 0. For
a > a∗, the instable invariant circle submerges into the fundamental steady state,
the fundamental steady state loses its stability, and there exists a stable invariant
circle which is far away from the fundamental steady state.
Equation (7) clearly indicates the impact of the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists
on the market price. The change of B-coefficient b affects the first Lyapunov coefficient
and the dynamics of the whole system (6). In particular, when the beliefs are symmetric
(b = 0), we have `1 < 0, meaning that the resulting Neimark-Sacker is supercritical. In
other words, when the extrapolation rate of the chartists increases, the price of the risky
asset fluctuates around its fundamental value and is characterised by a stable invariant
circle. However, when the chartists have asymmetric beliefs (so that b 6= 0), changes of
the intensity of the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists, measured by the B-coefficient,
lead to changing signal of the first Lyapunov coefficient so that `1 becomes positive. In
this case, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation becomes subcritical, meaning that there exist
two attractors, one is the stable fundamental steady state and one is a stable invariant
circle. Under this circumstance, the price evolution of the system (6) depends on the
initial state. When the initial price is close to its fundamental value, the risky asset
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price converges to the fundamental value asymptotically; however, when the initial price
is far away from its fundamental value, the risky asset price fluctuates wildly around the
fundamental value. This indicates that the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists is one of
the important sources for the complexity of market price.
Insert Figure 5 here
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate that when the extrapolation rate of the chartists to the price
trend increases, different types of Neimark-Sacker bifurcations occur. In particularly,
Figure 5 displays the bifurcation plot and phase plot when the beliefs of the chartists are
symmetrical, b = 0, to the up and down price signals. We demonstrate that when the
extrapolation rate of the chartists a increases to a∗ ≈ 1.4514, the fundamental steady
state loses its stability and a stable invariant circle around the fundamental steady state
appears and a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs with the corresponding
first Lyapunov coefficient of `1 = −0.4683 < 0. Consequently, the market price oscillates
in the neighborhood of the fundamental price.
Insert Figure 6 here
However, when the chartists’ beliefs are bullish, for instance b = −1.6, at the bifurca-
tion point a = a∗, the first Lyapunov coefficient of the fundamental steady state is posi-
tive, `1 = 0.0205 > 0. This implies that, when the extrapolation rate of the chartists a
crosses the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation point a∗, the fundamental steady state undergoes
a subcritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, leading to the coexistence of two attractors.
More precisely, when the activity of the chartists is very weak so that a = 1.42 < a∗, the
fundamental steady state is stable, see Figure 6(a). When the activity of the chartists
is relatively weak so that a = 1.451 / a∗, then there exist a stable fundamental steady
state and a stable invariant circle which are separated by an unstable invariant circle, as
shown in Figure 6(c). From Figure 6(e), we can see that if the initial price is far away
from its fundamental value, the risky asset price converges to the stable invariant circle
and generates high fluctuations; otherwise, the price converges to its fundamental value.
To sum up, the price behaviour of the risky asset depends on the initial states of the
system.
There is a strikingly simple economic intuition on the coexistence of a stable funda-
mental steady state and a stable invariant circle in our simple evolutionary model when
the chartists have strong bullish beliefs on the market but the extrapolation rate of the
chartists is relatively weakly. When the extrapolation rate of the chartists is weak, the
fundamental steady state will be locally stable, since the extrapolation from the chartists
for prices near the fundamental steady state is not strongly enough for prices to diverge
and the price will therefore converge to the fundamental steady state. However, when
the chartists’ extrapolate rate is weak, an upward price trend far away from the fun-
damental price will be reenforced, making the price to deviate even further away from
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the fundamental price due to the strong bullish beliefs of the chartists and a large long
position they have. Hence, such a diverging upward price trend is accelerated by the
demand of the chartists until the deviation reaches their threshold confidence level at
which the chartists become cautious. Once the chartists become less confident, they
reduce their long position. At the same time, since the price is also far away from the
fundamental, hence the fundamentalists buy the risky asset at a lower price and sell it
at a higher price. Therefore, the positions held by the fundamentalists and the chartists
are opposite, which slows down the upward price trend and eventually the price trend is
reversed and moves towards the fundamental price. This results in a situation that the
fundamentalists and chartists both are taking the short position, pushing the price down
so that the price will cross the fundamental price and drop further. However, because of
the strong bullish beliefs of the chartists, the downward price trend is slowed down by
relative small short position taken by the chartists. This, together with the pressure of
the long position taken by the fundamentalists, will reverse the price trend and push the
price upwards. By taking a long position along the price trend, the performance of the
chartists becomes better. The adaptive switching mechanism then makes the market
fraction of the chartists increase, resulting in the price overshooting the fundamental
price. This completes a full cycle around the locally stable fundamental steady state, as
illustrated in Figure 7(a). In the whole process, the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists
and their extrapolation to the market signal play very important roles.
Insert Figure 7 here
If the extrapolation rate of the chartists increases beyond the bifurcation point a∗
so that a = 1.46 > a∗, then the fundamental steady state loses its stability, resulting
in the disappearance of the unstable invariant circle which is then submerged into the
fundamental steady state, together with the stable invariant circle, as shown in Figure
6(g). In this case, even when the initial price is close to the fundamental value, the market
price will move away from the fundamental price and fluctuate along the stable invariant
circle. Hence, the overreaction of the chartists increases the fluctuation amplitude of
the market price. In addition, when a Neimark-Sacker or Chenciner bifurcation happens
with the change of some parameters, the size of the invariant circle generated from the
bifurcation will be enlarged with the increase of the parameters. Hence, as a policy
or regulation issues, if the bifurcation parameters, such as the reaction intensity of the
chartists to the price deviation, decrease when the price is in the uptrend along a larger
invariant circle, the trajectory of the price will move from the larger invariant circle to
a smaller one. Although the uptrend may not be changed immediately, the limitation of
the maximum price deviation from the fundamental steady state becomes smaller and
hence the market risk is reduced.
Similarly, when the chartists have the bearish beliefs so that b = 1.6, a subcritical
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs at a = a∗ with the corresponding Lyapunov coefficient
of `1 = 0.0145 > 0, as illustrated in Figure 6(right panel) and Figure 7(b). The difference
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from the bullish belief case is that the price is below its fundamental value most of time,
see Figure 6(f).
In this section, the complex phenomena induced by the asymmetric beliefs of the
chartists to market signals is examined when the fundamental steady state is unstable.
The application of the bifurcation theory uncovers the intrinsic characteristics of the
complex phenomena. The theoretic analysis in this section provides a guide to the
following numerical simulations of the stochastic model.
4 Stochastic Simulations
In Section 3, under the assumption of the constant fundamental steady state, we
analyse the complex dynamical behaviour of the system (6) with the change of param-
eters. However, in financial markets, the fundamental price usually is not constant but
random, which is affected by international financial markets. In addition, some uncer-
tain factors, such as the arrival of new events or new policies, can also influence the
market. Therefore, the randomness is an important element of financial markets. In this





1 + S( eβUt
eβUt+1
α(Ft − Pt) + 1eβUt+1gt(Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2)
)]
(1 +mt)
Ut+1 = (Pt+1 + yt+1 −RPt)
[
α(Ft − Pt)− gt(Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2)
]− C + ηUt,
where {Ft} is a random fundamental price process, {yt} is a random dividend process,
{mt} represents a market noise process, and gt(x) = ax/(1 + btx + c2x2). Here bt ∈
(−2c, 2c) is a time-varying parameter to capture the change of the beliefs of the chartists.
Based on the analysis in Section 3, we know that the system (6) displays different
dynamical characteristics with the change of b. Especially, when b = 0, the reaction of
the chartists to the signal of the market price is symmetric and, when the fundamental
steady state is unstable, a small invariant circle around the fundamental steady state
appears. However when b 6= 0, the chartists have asymmetric beliefs about the market
price. When b > 0, the chartists have the bearish beliefs so they react strongly when
there is downward price trend, leading to larger drop of the price. When b < 0, the
influence of the chartists on the market is other way around. The chartists may change
their beliefs from time to time. To capture this change, we consider that the chartists
change their beliefs over time and assume
bt = bt−1 ∗ (Nt = 0) + ζt ∗ (Nt > 0), (8)
where Nt is the signal of the belief changing of the chartists. When Nt = 0, the chartists
keep their former beliefs so that bt = bt−1; when Nt > 0, the chartists seek to change
their beliefs to ζt. For simplicity, we assume Nt is a Poisson process with a jump intensity
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λ and ζt is a Markovian chain with three states {b−, 0, b+} where b−(< 0) and b+(> 0)
correspond, respectively, to bullish and bearish beliefs. The question is then how the
chartists change their beliefs. In general, the state transformation of ζt can be determined
by an endogenous variable such as utility functions. As the first step towards the future
research, we assume that the transformation probability of ζt is given by a constant
matrix P .
In addition, assume that the logarithm of the fundamental price is given by a random
walk process, satisfying logFt+1 = logFt +
σF√
K
εt, F0 = F
∗, where σF ≥ 0 measures the
volatility of the fundamental return in K days, {εt} is independent and identically-
distributed, εt ∼ N (0, 1). Hence, E(logFt) = logF ∗. Note that this special structure of
the fundamental price implies that the change of the logarithmic fundamental price is
stationary. For the market noise {mt}, we assume mt = eσmξt − 1, where σm ≥ 0, {ξt} is





= 0. Define the changes of logarithmic prices as returns which is




= r∗t + σmξt,
where r∗t = log
[
1 + S( eβUt
eβUt+1
α(Ft − Pt) + 1eβUt+1gt(Pt − (1− ω)Pt−1 − ωPt−2)
)]
.
Similarly to the deterministic model, we select ω = 0.5, F ∗ = 100, k = 0.1, h = 0.1,
α = 1.2, a = 1.46, c = 1.2, β = 1, η = 0.2, R = 1.001, C = 0.1. Let the annual volatility
of the fundamental return be σF = 0.25 and K = 250 be the number of trading days per
year. The daily volatility of the market noise is fixed at σM = 0.008. The intensity of
the Poisson process is λ = 0.05. The three states of the Markovian process ζt are given









Insert Figure 8 here
Under the random perturbations, the stochastic model shows the deviation of the
market price from its fundamental value, see Figure 8(a), and volatility clustering illus-
trated in Figure 8(c). Also there is no significant autocorrelation among the returns of
the risky asset price, see Figure 8(f), but the absolute returns and squared returns have
significantly positive autocorrelations which decrease with the increase of time lags, see
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Figures 8(g)(h). In addition, the density of the return has high peak and fat tail with
kurtosis of 5.0394, see Figures 8(d)(e).
We now provide some intuitions on how the model is able to generate the deviation
from the fundamental value and volatility clustering. In fact, based on the dynamical
analysis of the corresponding deterministic system (6), we see that the bifurcation point
of (6) depends on the value of the fundamental price F ∗. Hence, when the logarithmic
fundamental price follows a random walk process, the fundamental steady state switches
between stability and instability. Furthermore, the daily return of the risky asset os-
cillates irregularly between two different levels underlined by the two attractors of the
deterministic model. This makes the absolute and squared returns significantly positive
autocorrelative. But because of the existence of the market noise, the daily returns per
se is unforeseen. Thus, the volatility clustering observed in the real market is replicated.
Also, since the chartists can hold the asymmetric, either bullish or bearish, beliefs, the
market price can deviate from its fundamental level upwards or downwards. As indicated
in the analysis of the corresponding deterministic system, the bullish beliefs can force
the risky asset price upward away from its fundamental value; in contrast, the bearish
beliefs can push the price down away from its fundamental value. Figure 9(a) shows
the deviation of the market price from its fundamental value and Figure 9(b) plots the
corresponding time series of B-coefficient.
Insert Figure 9 here
Note that in our model, investors adjust their investment strategy based on the
performance of the different trading strategies in the previous one period. Figure 10
illustrates the price trajectory and the time series of the performance difference and the
market fractions of the fundamentalists and chartists. From Figure 10, we can see that if
one strategy, either the fundamental analysis or the technical analysis, performs better,
then investors will switch to the better performed strategy. For example, at time around
the 2330th or 2367th time point, the fundamental analysis makes a better performance
and hence the market fraction of the fundamentalists increases while the population of
the chartists drops dramatically. However, at around the 2360th time point, the mar-
ket appears bullish so the technical analysis is more effective and the chartists perform
better, leading the agents to switch to the chartists. This phenomenon is called herd
behaviour, which strengthens the fluctuation of the market. The herd behaviour in the
Chinese markets has been studied by some authors, for example, Guo and Wu (2005)
prove the existence of the herd behaviour in the Chinese stock markets by mixed asset
pricing model. In addition, Figure 10 also indicates that the market is dominated by
the fundamentalists most of time. Given the advantage of the fundamentalists knowing
the fundamental value, the fundamentalists perform better when there are no obvious
fluctuations in the market such as at the 2367th time point. Nevertheless, the chartists
perform better than the fundamentalists only when there are persistent up- or down-
trends in the market, like around the 2360th time point. Moreover, if we consider the
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accumulative performance measure defined by letting η = 1 in (3), then the fundamen-
talists accumulate much more profits than the chartists, as shown in Figure 11, while
the accumulated profits of the chartists are associated with some fluctuations and un-
certainty. This demonstrates the different roles of the fundamental analysis in stablising
the market and the technical analysis in activising the market.
Insert Figure 10 here
Insert Figure 11 here
5 Conclusion
Different from the perfectly rational expectation and representative agent hypothesis
in the traditional financial theory, this paper uses heterogeneous beliefs and bounded
rationality as basic building blocks to construct a model of asset pricing with two types
of traders, fundamentalists and chartists. By analysing the dynamical characteristics and
stochastic simulations, we study the impact of the investors’ behaviour on the volatility
of a risky asset price and provide a new approach to study the volatility of the market
price by using the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems. Different from the literature,
we induce the asymmetric beliefs of the chartists to the market signal to describe their
bullish or bearish views, which lead to the coexistence of two attractors, the stable
fundamental steady state and a stable invariant circle around the fundamental steady
state. The stochastic simulations based on the theoretic analysis is able to generate
the stylised facts observed in financial markets. This paper, on the one hand, describes
the intrinsic characteristics of market volatility determined by the bounded rationality
of investors. On the other hand, it shows that it is important to control the intensity
of the asymmetric beliefs of investors in order to reduce the large fluctuation of the
price. Therefore, a consideration of strengthening the understanding of investors to
the fundamentals, regulating the speculative behaviour like momentum strategy, and
limiting the intensity of the asymmetric reaction of investors, is very useful to reduce the
deviation amplitude of the market price from its fundamental value and the possibility of
large fluctuations. By the stability analysis, we find that price limitation mechanism is
very useful to control the fluctuation amplitude of the market price, which supports the
policy of setting price limits to stabilise the market. In addition, encouraging institution
investors and reducing the cost of fundamental analysis are useful to increase the market
fraction of the fundamentalists, to improve the rationality of investment and to avoid
large market fluctuation. Based on our analysis, it is very helpful to avoid the large price
fluctuation by reducing the speed of changing strategies among investors, regulating
trading rules, introducing policies like T + 1 trading rule and encouraging long-term
investments for the benefit of taxes.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (1)A steady state should satisfy{
P = P
[
1 + S( eβU
eβU+1




U = (P + y¯ −RP )[α(F ∗ − P )− g(0)]− C + ηU. (A1)
It is obvious that (P ∗1 , U
∗
1 ) = (0,
αF ∗y¯−C




α(F ∗−P ) = 0. Furthermore, P = F ∗ and U = U∗(= −C
1−η ) are regarded as the
second solution of (A1), denoted as (P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ).
(2) The characteristic polynomial of the steady state (P ∗1 , U
∗





















αF ∗) > 1.
Thus, for all parameters, (P ∗1 , U
∗
1 ) is unstable.
(3) The characteristic polynomial of the steady state (P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ) = (F
∗, U∗) is Γ2(λ) =
(λ− η)(λ3 + c1λ2 + c2λ+ c3), where c1 = −1 + α¯− a¯, c2 = a¯(1− ω), c3 = a¯ω. Hence
pi1 = 1 + c1 + c2 + c3 = α¯,
pi2 = 1− c1 + c2 − c3 = 2− α¯+ a¯(2− 2ω),
pi3 = 1− c2 + c1c3 − c23 = 1− a¯+ α¯a¯ω − a¯2(ω + ω2).
By Jury Test, (F ∗, U∗) is locally asymptotically stable if and only if pii > 0 (i = 1, 2, 3)




(a¯, α¯) : 0 < a¯ <
1
ω
, max{0, (ωa¯+ 1)((1 + ω)a¯− 1)
a¯ω
} < α¯ < 2 + 2a¯(1− ω)
}
,
D0(a¯, α¯) := {(a¯, α¯) : 0 < a¯ < 1, 0 < α¯ < 2 + 2a¯}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: By Jury Test and Theorem of Generalised Neimark-Sacker
Bifurcation (cf. Kuznetsov, 2004), the result is obvious. ¥
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Notes
1 If the chartists also have the information about the fundamentals, especially taking the
fundamental price into account of their investment strategy, then we will have a different
system from (6), leading to different dynamics. We refer to Brock and Hommes (1998),
Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan (2007) and Hommes (2006) for further discussion along
these lines.
2 Since there is only one type of chartists, all chartists in the market have the same be-
liefs about the market trend: all chartists think the market is either bullish or bearish.
In general, different chartists can have different beliefs and adopt different strategies,
meaning that different chartists can have different B-coefficients. For more general cases,
B-coefficient can rely on the market price. We leave these to future work.
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Figure 1: S-function
(a) Down-adjustment (b) Up-adjustment




Figure 4: The stable region of the steady state (P ∗2 , U
∗
2 ) in the parameter space of (a¯, α¯, ω)
(a) and Dω∗ is denoted as the projection of D onto the plane ω = ω
∗ (b).
(a) bifurcation plot (b) phase plot
Figure 5: Fix ω = 0.5, F ∗ = 100, k = 0.1, h = 0.1, α = 1.2, b = 0, c = 1.2, β = 1,
η = 0.2, R = 1.001, C = 0.1, consider the symmetric belief case, that is b = 0, and
regard the reaction coefficient of the chartists a as the bifurcation parameter. When a
increases, the fundamental steady state loses its stability at a ≈ 1.4514 and a stable
invariant circle appears whose first Lyapunov coefficient is `1 = −0.4683.
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(a) b < 0, a = 1.42 (b) b > 0, a = 1.42
(c) b < 0, a = 1.451 (d) b > 0, a = 1.451
(e) b < 0, a = 1.451, Time Series (f) b > 0, a = 1.451, Time Series
(g) b < 0, a = 1.46 (h) b > 0, a = 1.46
Figure 6: Fix ω = 0.5, F ∗ = 100, k = 0.1, h = 0.1, α = 1.2, c = 1.2, β = 1,
η = 0.2, R = 1.001, C = 0.1 and regard the reaction coefficient of the chartists a as the
bifurcation parameter. When b = −1.6 < 0 (left panel) and b = 1.6 > 0 (right panel), at
a ≈ 1.4514, the subcritical bifurcations occur and the stable fundamental steady state
with a stable invariant circle coexists (c), (d).
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(a) b < 0, a = 1.451

























(b) b > 0, a = 1.451
Figure 7: When the coexistence of two attractors appears, the process of the price, excess
demands of the fundamentalists and chartists and market fractions corresponding to the
stable invariant circle are shown.
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(a) Risky asset price and its fundamental price























(c) Return of the risky asset price (r)












(d) Density of the return

















(e) QQ-plot of the return









(f) Autocorrelation of the return ACF (r)












(g) Autocorrelation of the absolute return ACF (|r|)










(h) Autocorrelation of the squared return ACF (r2)
Figure 8: Simulation results.
31














(a) Risky asset price and its fundamental price













Figure 9: Enlargement of Figures 8(a), (b).
























(a) Market fraction of the fundamentalists nf
and the risky asset price P
























(b) Market fraction of the fundamentalists nf
and performance measure difference U = Uf − Uc
Figure 10: Herd behaviour



























Figure 11: Accumulative performance measure of the fundamentalists AUf and chartists
AUc, where AUq,t = AUq,t−1 + (Pt + yt −RPt−1)Dqt−1 − Cq (q = f, c).
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